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Abstract—The number of mobile and IoT devices connected
to home and enterprise networks is growing fast. These devices
offer new services and experiences for the users; however,
they also present new classes of security threats pertaining
to data and device safety and user privacy. In this article, we
first analyze the potential threats presented by these devices
connected to edge networks. We then propose Securebox:
a new cloud-driven, low cost Security-as-a-Service solution
that applies Software-Defined Networking (SDN) to improve
network monitoring, security and management. Securebox
enables remote management of networks through a cloud
security service (CSS) with minimal user intervention required.
To reduce costs and improve the scalability, Securebox is
based on virtualized middleboxes provided by CSS. Our
proposal differs from the existing solutions by integrating
the SDN and cloud into a unified edge security solution,
and by offering a collaborative protection mechanism that
enables rapid security policy dissemination across all connected
networks in mitigating new threats or attacks detected by
the system. We have implemented two Securebox prototypes,
using a low-cost Raspberry-PI and off-the-shelf fanless PC.
Our system evaluation has shown that Securebox can achieve
automatic network security and be deployed incrementally to
the infrastructure with low management overhead.
Keywords-IoT, smart home, security, network, firewall, mid-
dlebox, architecture
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent advancements in technology have been the driving
factor in the development of the new generation of smart
portable devices including smart phones, smart watches, and
tablet PCs to give some examples. Together they add up to
more than 3 billion devices and their number is growing at a
fast pace [44]. Internet of Things (IoT) has recently gained
huge popularity among consumers and estimates predict that
more than 20 billion IoT devices will be connected to the
Internet by 2020 [7]. IoT devices typically contain sensors
and operate on limited computational and power resources.
These devices are connected to the Internet either directly
or via an IoT hub. IoT devices are primarily used to collect
data from surroundings. This data is later analyzed to extract
valuable information to be used in different applications.
IoT devices offer many time saving and comfort features
for an average user [1]. Users can remotely switch off smart
lights or open door locks using their mobile phones. With a
number of smart IoT devices launched every day, IoT vows
to bring convenience to user’s everyday life.
Medium and large scale enterprises are adopting Bring
Your Own Device (BYOD) policies for allowing their em-
ployees and guests to connect their personal devices to the
enterprise network. Connecting a large number of hetero-
geneous devices to the enterprise network has brought a
new set of problems for enterprise network security. Since
most of the users do not know about malware and exploits
potentially installed in their smart devices, any infected de-
vice can compromise security of the entire network. Surveys
show that majority of Chief Information Security Officers
(CISOs) feel that network security operations have become
much more difficult to manage compared to the past [6].
Software-Defined Networking (SDN) promises to change
the way traditional networks are managed by offering a
flexible model that supports innovation [21], [37]. SDN has
been used for wide area networks (WAN) and data center
environments [34]. SDN has not been applied for the home
networks yet; however, we believe that it can support this
environment with better security and remote management
capabilities. Previous research has showcased techniques
for using SDN for dynamic re-routing of traffic through
middleboxes deployed outside the network [15], [14], [27].
Security and privacy are important concerns for online
users and applications. With the recent popularity of e-
commerce, cloud storage and cloud based services, network
security and user privacy have become even more important.
IoT and BYOD related security threats are fairly new to
existing network security techniques and tools, which are
mostly designed for large enterprise networks [6]. Therefore,
we need to develop new techniques for securing these net-
works connecting large numbers of heterogeneous devices.
The cost of deploying and operating network security
solutions, e.g., firewall (FW), deep packet inspection (DPI)
is high. Therefore, these solutions are mainly adopted by
large enterprises with sufficient resources to deploy and
maintain them. Small enterprise and home users also need
similar facilities, but do not have the resources. Our work in
this article introduces the advantages of these sophisticated
security and remote management solutions to all users with
low cost.
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The main contributions of this paper are:
• Introducing SDN at the edge for automatic network
security, management and bringing the benefits of secu-
rity services from cloud-based virutalized middleboxes
security services to smart home and small/medium
enterprise users.
• Proposing Securebox: a redesigned, low-cost, remotely
manageable home gateway for securing smart home,
IoT, BYOD environments and Cloud-based Security
Service: a cost efficient, scalable security service of-
fering automatic network management, traffic analysis
services for detection/mitigation of network threats
using collaborative mechanism.
• Implementation and evaluation of Securebox and
Cloud-based Security Service demonstrating feasibility
of proposed system in live networks.
Roadmap: Section II identifies a set of key security prob-
lems in different networked environments. Section III ex-
plains the design and architecture of our proposed solution.
Section IV describes the implementation details of system
prototypes. We evaluate system performance in Section V.
We discuss the limitations in current state of the art in
Section VI before concluding in Section VII. For simplicity,
rest of the paper will refer to IoT, hand-held device as
user device and smart home, small enterprise and small
office/home office networks as SOHO networks.
II. BACKGROUND
Typically, the routers or gateways installed in SOHO
networks are mainly protecting user devices in the network.
These gateways provide Network Address Translation (NAT)
features and prevent direct access to the devices from the
outside network. However, new generation of IoT devices
offer remote management features, which require the devices
to expose a management interface to the Internet. Some
IoT devices are connected to an IoT hub or user’s smart
phone which is further connected to the Internet, therefore,
providing an indirect way to access these devices.
With more and more devices connected to SOHO net-
works, they are becoming a lucrative target for criminals.
Criminals can remotely break into a user’s home network
and passively monitor IoT sensor traffic for determining if
the user is at home or not, an attacker can remotely open
door locks or disable the perimeter security system. This
information can be sold and utilized in various ways not
approved by the user. Recently, researchers have shown how
a connected car can be remotely controlled, which can result
in fatal accidents [45].
Most of these devices in BYOD environments are not pro-
tected and can be contaminated with malware and spyware.
Users also carry their devices to conference rooms and fa-
cilities with limited access. The recording instruments, e.g.,
microphone, camera, GPS can be used to record valuable
secret information and transfer it to unwanted entities. Such
devices can also infect other devices in the network.
Recently, a number of attacks have surfaced in which
millions of devices are hacked to remotely control them for
malicious activities. Hundreds of thousands of home routers
were remotely controlled as of February 2014 to change
their DNS server setting to an attacker’s controlled server.
These hacked devices were then used to perform phishing,
click fraud attacks etc.
Poor device management significantly eases the task of
an attacker to remotely access user devices. In late 2014, a
hacker searched the Internet for connected CCTV cameras
and tried logging in to them using factory default login
credentials. The attacker was able to login to thousands
of CCTV cameras across the world and obtain live video
feed [7]. Similarly, there have been incidents where personal
computers were hacked to record live footage from webcams
and used for blackmailing and extortion [61].
A. Motivation and Problem Statement
With the continuous evolution and growing trend of
security and privacy attacks using personal computing and
smart devices, there is a need for improving network security
by monitoring and auditing device activity and detecting
security issues [5]. SOHO and smart enterprise networks
are either poorly managed or not managed at all due to lack
of resources, vigilance and motivation on behalf of users.
As a result, an attacker can break into these networks to
gain access and potentially control the devices inside these
networks. These compromised devices can then be used for
spying on user activities, click-fraud, phishing, Distributed
Denial of Services (DDoS) attacks, bitcoin mining etc. These
issues put SOHO networks at the center of network security
picture [10].
Users would like to have network devices that are secure
and easy to manage [20]. Recent research has shown that
users are more comfortable and enthusiastic to manage their
networks when they obtain more information about their
network activity [20], [19]. The need for making network
management easier and simpler is more prominent in SOHO
networks, because it is neither feasible nor scalable to hire
experts who can individually manage the security of each
network [18].
In our research, we conducted a user study of 150 users
from academia and industry to assess user perceptions in
home network security management. Our user study of 150
users has revealed that majority (≥80%) of users find it
very difficult to manage their network access points and
gateways and require an easy to operate version of these
devices. Therefore, average users should not be burdened
with the complex tasks of managing home network. Our
work envisions a network gateway which offload manage-
ment and operational tasks to an external entity (i.e., network
management service provider), which has more resources
and expertise to perform these operations.
Our proposed gateway will act as a sensor in the network
and collect traffic statistics and insights to share them with
a service provider. Service provider will use these statistics
to (re)configure all gateways in real-time in providing better
security against attacks and malicious activities. This model
helps in managing networks more efficiently, because the
service provider will have a better view across multiple net-
works and will be able to make well-informed decisions. The
broad view of network will also help to identify suspicious
traffic trends which might have gone previously unnoticed .
B. IoT threats analysis
IoT environments introduce many heterogeneous devices
running a variety of protocols and software versions. Due
to their small size, low power and limited resources, many
of these devices are not even running an operating system.
These devices are mainly developed by startups or fast
moving teams in enterprises, which work on limited budget
and resources. These teams are hurried to develop and
launch their products to the market. Therefore, security is
often neglected during the design and development of these
products. There is usually a lengthy, if any, update cycle for
most of these devices. Owing to the number of sensors on
these devices with no software updates, a number of security
threats are raised against these devices.
In enterprise BYOD environments, presence of hetero-
geneous devices make the issue more grave for network
security team. Table I presents an overview of design and
limitations in current state of the art for privacy and security
in home networks.
Due to resource constraint, it is very hard to imple-
ment security features on IoT devices. Some manufacturers
use Trusted platform hardware (TPM) and hardware based
scheme for securing these devices [46]. However, this app-
roach is not feasible because of the limited computational
and power resources available on IoT devices. A smart
solution is to provide fully authenticated and verified access
to data collection and operations of these devices, so that
no attacker can hijack a device to steal the data or spy
on user [2]. Since a majority of malware spread among
devices, we should also inspect and restrict uncontrolled
device to device (D2D) communications for presenting the
devices from infecting each other. In addition, several IoT
hubs available on the market lack of such security features
[47], [48]. Our proposed cloud-assisted gateway is designed
to provide these features for IoT and BYOD environments.
III. CLOUD ASSISTED SECUREBOX
Based on the set of issues identified in the previous
sections, this article proposes a new architecture for remote
network management in smart home and small enterprise
environments.
A. Overview
The proposed solution consists of two key components,
i.e., Securebox and Cloud-based Security Service (CSS). The
proposed system is designed to scale in different networks
including smart home, SOHO and small/medium/enterprise
(SME) environments with multiple offices.
The client end, i.e., Securebox uses SDN for network
management and operations. Securebox can provide features
e.g. device isolation, authenticated device to device (D2D)
communication, identification of infected/compromised de-
vices, security profiling of devices etc. whereas CSS can
provide cost efficient and scalable detailed traffic analysis
and network management features.
B. Client Edge
Securebox is a modified gateway running SDN con-
troller and OpenVswitch. Figure 1 shows the architecture
of Securebox. Securebox has a local policy database (Pol-
DB) which contains security policies for different traffic
classes along with specified actions. Securebox is a cheaper
replacement for contemporary manageable home gateways
in user networks. It provides wired and wireless interfaces
to connect user devices. All the traffic flowing to/from
the network passes through the Securebox which enforces
network policies on this traffic. Securebox delegates all the
traffic analysis, security and network management tasks to
the CSS.
Management 
Interface
SDN ControllerSmartphone
Workstation
PC
Laptop
Tablet
Switching Hardware
Policy 
Database
Cloud Security Service
Internet
Figure 1: Securebox architecture
1) Deployment: Securebox comes pre-configured to con-
nect to the service provider specified CSS and user only
needs to connect it to Internet. Securebox management
and Pol-DB update are automatically handled by the CSS.
Therefore, Therefore, users are free from manually con-
figuring and managing their gateways. Securebox provides
an interface showing stats about bandwidth usage per de-
vice, security risks detected and removed, suspicious traffic
to/from devices in the network, D2D communications etc.
Current State of Art
Research Contribution Limitations
A. Brown et al. [19] HomeNetViewer: tool for collecting, annotating do-
mestic network NetFlow records.
Neither addresses security, privacy challenges in
home networks nor IoT specific issues.
M. Chetty et al. [20] uCAP: tool for monitoring network bandwidth usage
in home networks.
Does not address security and privacy challenges
for IoT, other devices in home network. Does not
audit network traffic to detect suspicious activities
in network.
A. Alwabel et al. [22] SENSS: an interface for querying ISP to detect
anomalies.
Needs to modify ISPs. Does not address challenges
from IoT, traffic analysis. Requires expertise to make
use of queried information.
R. Meyran [23] DefenseFlow: SDN application that programs net-
works for DoS/DDoS security.
Aimed specifically at enterprise network, high cost,
does not address IoT challenges, (currently) limited
to DoS/DDoS detection only.
J. Sherry et al. [24] Deploying middleboxes in cloud for scalability and
cost efficiency.
Addresses only large enterprise use-case, does not
talk about security or privacy challenges in IoT
domain or SME networks.
Y. de Montjoye et al. [3] OpenPDS: Personal metadata management frame-
work allowing user to collect store and manage third
party access to their metadata.
Needs support by software products and services
for deployment, needs effort from user to manage
storage and access of data to third parties. No design
support for feedback to the user.
H. Haddadi et al. [30] Databox: collects personal data for user and
providers controlled access to this data for third
parties.
Needs realization of concept to access real world
applicability. Security services should be redesigned
to support databox. User needs to manage the con-
trolled access to this data.
Table I: Current state of the art: Contributions and limitations
After configuring CSS, a user profile is set up at CSS
for traffic analysis tasks. Securebox then receives a Pol-DB
update from CSS. This update consists of a basic set of
network policies and is stored in Pol-DB. Later, Pol-DB is
regularly updated by CSS, see Section III-C3.
Figure 2 shows the deployment architectures for Secure-
box where devices are directly connected to the Securebox
running an SDN controller and OVS, see Fig. 2a and devices
directly connect to it. Scenario B, shown in Fig. 2b, shows
the Securebox running an SDN controller and managing OF-
capable switches and wireless access points (AP) to which
user devices are connected. Securebox is also connected to
the CSS and Internet as expected.
(a) Scenario A
(b) Scenario B
Figure 2: Securebox deployment
Securebox mainly gets the network policies from the CSS.
However, Securebox design offers flexibility for power users
to configure policies of their own choice e.g. A user can con-
figure that ”Allow my CCTV to connect to my file server (for
video feed storage)”. These manually configured policies can
be devices specific and have a higher priority than those
received from CSS. Securebox can also provide security
ranking for each device connected to the network, based
on device activity, giving user a better understanding device
behaviour. It can generate warnings for the user whenever
a suspicious activity is detected and quarantined. These
warnings can be displayed on web interface or delivered
to user’s smart phone.
2) Functioning: The flow processing algorithm of Se-
curebox is presented in Algorithm 1. When a new traffic flow
is initiated to/ from a device in the local network, Securebox
interrupts this flow, extracts some information (6 tuple) from
this flow and checks Pol-DB for any matching policy for this
traffic flow. If a matching policy is found, the associated
decision to allow or drop this traffic is applied to the traffic
flow.
If there is no matching policy available, Securebox sends
this data to the CSS, which analyzes this data using the
user preferred mechanism and returns a security policy.
Securebox stores this policy in Pol-DB and applies the
decision to the requested traffic flow. In future, similar traffic
flow request will get matching policies from the Pol-DB
and Securebox will not need to send the traffic to CSS for
analysis.
If user installs a CCTV camera for a perimeter security
system and the CCTV camera opens a connection to an
arbitrary server on the Internet to send video feed, Securebox
will intercept this new traffic flow request. Securebox will
then extract and send some statistics to CSS for analysis
which will identify that user’s CCTV camera should not be
allowed to connect to any arbitrary server. It will formulate
a security policy directing the Securebox to deny any traffic
flows which tries to connect CCTV camera to any arbitrary
server outside the network. Securebox will implement this
policy and deny connection request from the CCTV camera.
Any subsequent requests from the CCTV camera to connect
to the same or any other arbitrary server will be denied.
Securebox needs to have connectivity with the CSS in
order to get the traffic analysis and Pol-DB updates in
real time. However, system design allows Securebox to
work even when connection to CSS is not available. In
that case, Securebox uses Pol-DB to make decisions for
incoming traffic flow requests and implements an implicit
allow/deny decision rule for traffic flows with no matching
policy available.
Another solution is to push some decision-making to the
Securebox. This solution will increase hardware require-
ments for the Securebox therefore increasing the costs and
complexity of system. This solution will require more user
interaction and most users would not be comfortable with
managing all these services.
Secureboxes also act as sensors in the networks to collect
information about the network activity and report it back
to CSS. CSS then analyzes this information to make better
informed decisions for enhanced network and security man-
agement and improve quality of service (QoS) to enhance
user experience.
C. Cloud-based Security Service
CSS is a low cost, highly scalable, service-based so-
lution running in the cloud environment to provide secu-
rity services including traffic analysis through middleboxes,
malware and botnet detection to the clients. It allows any
subscriber to run personalized traffic analysis services in the
cloud environment at reduced costs and improved scalability.
1) Architecture: Figure 3 shows the architecture of CSS.
Cloud Manager is the central component of the whole
system. Cloud Manager is responsible for handling client
requests, managing resources, deploying and maintaining
middleboxes, handling traffic analysis tasks. Cloud manager
delegates some of the sub-tasks to other entities in the CSS.
The certification authority manages the certificates for the
system and all the subscribers, i.e., Secureboxes. The impact
of certification authority on system security is explained
in detail in Section V-F. CSS also runs ”Backup Cloud
Manager” which is a state-aware, hot-swappable replica of
Cloud Manager which can replace the cloud manager in case
it goes down. This improves fault-tolerance and scalability
of the system.
Algorithm 1 Securebox flow processing algorithm
connect to CSS
bootstrap policy-DB
while traffic flow request do
# Extract metadata from incoming connection requests
metadata← extractMetadata(traffic flow)
# if matching policy exists in policy database
if policy exists(metadata) then
# extract decision from matching policy
policy decision← getDecision(metadata)
# insert traffic flow and update log
insertF low(OF switch, traffic flow request)
updateLog(event)
else
# get decision from cloud-security-service
policy ← getSecurityPolicy(metadata)
# insert traffic flow cache security policy and log
event
insertF low(OF switch, traffic flow request)
updatePolicyDB(policy)
updateLog(event)
end
end
SOHO 
Threat Analysis Service
Malware Analysis Service
Middlebox 
Manager 1
Certification Server
Cloud Manager
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Backup cloud manger
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Figure 3: Cloud-based security service architecture
Several kinds of middleboxes, e.g., Intrusion Detection
System (IDS), Intrusion Prevention System (IPS), FW can
be deployed in the cloud environment. Middlebox Manager
manages the deployment and operations (e.g. load balancing,
fault tolerance) of middleboxes deployed for traffic analysis.
Some of the middleboxes are analyzing traffic from delay
sensitive applications or enterprises so CSS maintains hot-
swappable state-aware replicas of theses middleboxes to
improve fault tolerance and efficiency of the system. The
instances of middleboxes running in the backup middleboxes
pool can immediately swap any middlebox which fails
during operations.
There is a huge volume of network traffic flowing to CSS
from multiple subscriber networks. This enormous amount
of data can be utilized to extract valuable statistics about
network traffic, QoS, devices connected to the network.
CSS runs various kind of anlaysis on this traffic to ex-
tract valuable insights from the traffic. Figure 3 shows the
threat and malware analysis services running in CSS. These
services use traffic statistics collected from Secureboxes to
detect malwares, botnets and other malicious traffic flowing
through various networks. The broad view across a number
of networks helps in detecting the tiny traces of malicious
traffic which usually goes undetected through the traditional
network perimeter security systems.
2) CSS Functioning: After user profile is created for
CSS, all subsequent traffic analysis requests from the (user
specific) Securebox are handled according to the preferences
of user profile. When a traffic analysis request arrives from
a registered Securebox, request handler either sends it to
dedicated middleboxes or traffic analysis service depending
upon the user profile. The traffic analysis service returns a
decision for the incoming request and request handler sends
this decision to the Securebox in form of a security policy.
Algorithm 2 presents the different operations pertaining to
request processing.
Following the example given in Section III-B when the
Securebox requests a decision on whether to allow CCTV
camera to connect to arbitrary server, CSS analyses the
incoming information. CSS maintains a list of addresses of
safe/ known servers and the requested connection to un-
known server will be flagged suspicious. CSS will generate
a policy to ”drop any traffic from CCTV which does not go
to (specific) well known servers on the Internet” and send it
to the Securebox.
Enterprise subscribers can use leased middleboxes for
analyzing their traffic (as it offers high availability and
low processing delay). On the other hand, subscribers from
SOHO networks can analyze their traffic in the middleboxes
run by CSS for general traffic analysis. Every subscriber can
configure the type and sequence of middleboxes used for
analyzing their traffic, see Section III-C4. Subscribers can
opt-out to share their traffic statistics to be used in other
analysis services, as explained in Section V-C
CSS can share the traffic analysis results with other
service providers to help them improve their services, QoS
and user experience. It can also provide interfaces to third
parties for running several kind of analysis on network traffic
statistics collected by CSS, for detecting botnets, malware
and track suspicious servers hosted over the Internet. This
massive and diverse collection of network level traffic statis-
tics can also be very useful for research community as well.
Algorithm 2 CSS request processing algorithm
bootstrap system, services
launch middleboxes
while incoming analysis requests do
# extract information from incoming request
info← extractInfo(incoming request)
# if matching policy exists in security-policy-store
if policy exists(incoming request) then
# get security policy from store and send to client
sec policy ← getPolicy(incoming request)
sendToClient(sec policy, incoming request id)
# update logs
updateLog(event)
else
# Extract user profile and perform required security
analysis
user profile← getUserProfile(incoming request)
sec policy ← analyzeRequest(user profile,
incoming request)
sendToUser(sec policy, incoming request id)
# cache security policy (if allowed by agreement)
and update logs
storePolicy(sec policy)
updateLog(event)
end
end
3) Policy-DB updates: The decisions made for the in-
coming traffic analysis requests are cached in the Policy
Store managed by CSS. The information obtained from the
threat analysis services run by CSS is also aggregated and
stored in the form of network policies. CSS generates regular
updates for Secureboxes from the policies collected in Policy
Store. These updates are issued to all connected Secureboxes
to improve their ability to handle more traffic locally and
immediately block any attempts to attack the network. These
policy updates from CSS enable smooth functioning of
Securebox without requiring user participation.
In the CCTV camera example, when a decision is made
that CCTV camera should not be allowed to connect to
any arbitrary server (other than well known servers), the
next policy update will transfer this security policy to all
connected Secureboxes. The next time if a CCTV camera
connected through any of these Secureboxes will attempt
to connect to any arbitrary server, the connection will
be refused by the Securebox without sending an analysis
request to the CSS.
The policy update mechanism provides a number of
advantages. It significantly reduces the number of traffic
analysis requests sent to CSS which reduces the burden on
the service provider infrastructure as well as reduces the
uplink traffic and saving precious bandwidth. A number of
(a) Service Chaining (b) Traffic Tunnelling
Figure 4: Service chaining
these benefits are explained in detail in Section V-B.
CSS maintains a complete history of all previous updates
and current policies in the policy store. At every update,
it refines and includes only those policies which were not
previously sent. There is a trade-off for the frequency of
issuing these updates. If updates are issued too frequently,
the size of each update will be smaller, update cycle will
be faster and security attacks and threats will be detected
more quickly across all networks. However it will also result
in more traffic to the Securebox, hence consuming more
bandwidth of the user. On the other hand, less frequent
updates will use less bandwidth and will increase delay in
dissemination of policies required to block network attacks.
In the proposed system design, high priority policies are
immediately updated to the Secureboxes whereas policies
having less priority are bundled together and sent to the
user during hours of lesser network activity e.g. nighttime.
4) Service Chaining: The CSS architecture provides sup-
port for service chaining for the subscribers to easily com-
bine various kind of network services for analyzing their
network traffic. Fig. 4a shows the case where user has chosen
separate traffic analysis techniques for different classes of
traffic being analyzed e.g. User A has configured that all
traffic from IoT devices (i.e. smart fridge, smart TV) belong
to class A and traffic from smart phone, tablet or personal
computing devices should be classified as Class B traffic.
CSS will analyze traffic from each class through a separate
set of middleboxes chosen by the subscriber. Traffic from
Class A will be analyzed by a FW whereas Class B traffic
will be analyzed by FW, IDS and DPI instance running in
the CSS environment.
This feature allows subscribers to save the cost and
run multiple kind of analysis on its traffic classified into
various classes. The proposed architecture allows the user to
dynamically modify the analysis services chained together,
providing complete control over the traffic analysis being
performed on user traffic.
Figure 4b shows the scenario where the user has config-
ured the Securebox to route all the traffic through the CSS.
This features allows user to perform middlebox analysis
on the whole traffic session involving suspicious traffic.
This scenario is especially useful for enterprise users who
would like to have all the traffic from guest devices to
pass through a set of middleboxes. Subscriber can add/
remove middleboxes on the path of this traffic and using
cloud resources offers better scalability as the user traffic
volume increases, hence preventing middlebox deployment
to become a bottleneck and degrade user experience. Similar
concepts have been introduced for re-routing the traffic
through middleboxes deployed elsewhere and their work can
be used as a feature in the proposed system [27], [24].
D. User subscription models
The proposed architecture allows users to reserve a single
or set of dedicated middlebox instances for their traffic
analysis, achieving low latency and high availability. It also
allows to subscribe for traffic analysis services without
leasing any middlebox instances. The latter solution will
offer lower costs and slightly higher latencies. Section III-C4
explains how a subscriber can benefit from service chaining
features offered by the CSS.
Another subscription model allows user to receive pe-
riodic network policy updates from CSS without actively
analyzing their traffic in middleboxes. All these subscription
models include remote management and updates for the
Securebox as well.
E. Deployment Models
The proposed architecture offers three deployment models
for CSS examined below.
1) Third party security service provider: In this model,
user gets a pre-configured Securebox from third party service
provider. Power users can configure Securebox to connect to
the CSS of their choice. Service provider can run different
kind of traffic analysis on subscriber traffic and get monetary
benefits from the traffic statistics collected from various
connected networks. This data is valuable for the IoT device
manufacturers, service providers (e.g. Netflix 1)., Internet
Service Providers (ISPs). It can lead to development of new
technologies with built-in security features offering better
user experience and QoS.
2) ISP based deployment: ISPs can also deploy CSS to
provide network management services to their customers. In
typical deployments, ISPs provide a home gateway which
can be modified to work as a Securebox. ISP’s adoption of
proposed system will be useful for both customers and ISP.
Following this model, customers would not need to install
a new gateway and ISP can get valuable information about
the user networks to offer distinguished and personalized
services. This model will save the cost of deployment and
operation for both customers and ISPs and improve ISP
operations.
3) Private deployment: Private deployment model is use-
ful for research and enterprise-scale deployments since it
provides a complete control over the infrastructure. In this
model, a client (e.g. enterprise) deploys its own CSS and
1www.netflix.com
the Secureboxes are managed by using this private CSS.
This model provides a central control interface to monitor
and operate network across all deployments. All the traffic
is analyzed in a centrally managed infrastructure where
personalized traffic analysis techniques can be applied to
the data. Private deployment model reduces any privacy
concerns since the network information is not shared to third
party to any external entity.
In traditional networks, it is possible to deploy mid-
dleboxes centrally at a gateway location and traffic from
different establishments is routed through the centrally de-
ployed middleboxes. However, these gateways frequently
become bottlenecks, resulting in bad user experience. This
model offers very little flexibility for configuration, man-
agement and operations in live deployment. However, the
proposed system will offer more flexibility by enabling
network managers to classify the traffic and change the
middleboxes on the fly. It will greatly improve fault tolerance
by significantly reducing downtime of middleboxes. It also
improves scalability of infrastructure during peak access
periods without compromising user experience and network
operations.
IV. SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION
We have implemented two prototypes for evaluating the
real-world performance of the proposed system. Our pro-
totype system was demonstrated in the ACM S3 workshop
and the Cloud Security Services (CLoSe) Workshop [31],
[33].
A. Securebox
The primary components of Securebox (SB) are an SDN
controller used for enforcing network policies and gateway
management, Open Virtual Switch (OVS) for network level
functions and a policy-database for storing the network
policies.
For the two prototype of Securebox, we used Fit-PC3 pro-
Linux (fitPC) and Raspberry PI (R-Pi) [55], [54]. Table II
gives a comparison of hardware specification of both de-
vices. Section V gives a detailed evaluation of performance
achieved by both version of Securebox. Our implementa-
tion of Securebox uses Floodlight SDN controller v1.1 at
minimal configuration and OVS version 2.4.0 [52], [53]. A
backup copy of Pol-DB (to be used in case of reboot) is
also stored in the local file system. Policy table is currently
implemented using hash tables but bloom filters can also be
used [32].
Portability: Deploying Securebox on Raspberry Pi sized
devices makes it much more portable for personal use. Users
can carry Securebox and connect it to any available (inse-
cure) Internet connection e.g. public Wi-Fi, hotel networks.
Users then enable the option for setting up a secure personal
access point (S-PAP) and connect their personal devices to
the S-PAP. This approach will prevent any malware, spyware
Raspberry PI 2
(Model B)
Fit-PC3 pro Linux
CPU 900Mhz Quad-Core 1.6 Ghz Dual Core
Memory 1 GB 4 GB
Storage SD Card 320 GB
Ethernet 1 5
Wireless None 802.11 b/g/n
USB interface 4 6
HDMI Yes Yes
Cost USD 35 USD 533
Table II: Comparison between Raspberry-Pi and Fit-PC3
etc. on the insecure network from infecting user devices. It
also prevents illegal access to user’s devices connected to
insecure network.
B. Security Service
Security Service in the early prototype system was de-
ployed using the OpenStack platform to dynamically deploy
Docker containers running a simplified version of SNORT
as an IDS instance and a Firewall service [42], [40], [41].
The choice of using Docker-based infrastructure instead of
virtual machines was taken due to performance benefits
of Docker containers [12]. However, that discussion is
out of scope for this paper. Cloud Manager program was
implemented to manage Docker containers, request handling
of client events and load balancing across dockers. Cloud
manager is also responsible of disseminating the client
networks with the current network policies. Currently, we
are also evaluating Kubernetes as a platform to deploy CSS
[50].
V. SYSTEM EVALUATION
We evaluate the prototype system against different scenar-
ios. In order to minimize latency and maximize privacy for
user, and as well as performance gain by using collaborative
threat detection/mitigation mechanism, we have upgraded
the system design multiple rounds.
A. Latency
Latency is an important factor for user experience. As
identified in [49] higher latencies can result in significant
drop of website business. The proposed system design is
susceptible to increase latency because the traffic analysis is
done in the cloud environment.
In order to minimize the latency experienced by user,
only metadata (by default: 6 tuple) information from the
initial connection request is sent to CSS for analysis. Policies
are cached locally to be used for any subsequent similar
connection request. When a user accesses a website e.g.
Youtube 2 for the first time, Securebox does not find a
matching policy in Pol-DB and contacts security service
2www.youtube.com
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Figure 5: Performance comparison for user experienced latency
Network SB
(fitPC)
SB
(R-Pi)
Download Speed (Mbps) 13.1 12.905 12.6
Upload Speed (Mbps) 2.153 1.783 1.69
Download Consistency 80% 78% 78%
Upload Consistency 86% 83% 82%
Download BW (Mbps) 18.504 17.693 17.296
Jitter (server→ client) ms 3.3 6.4 7.8
Jitter (client→ server) ms 5.8 7.6 8.2
Packet loss (client→ server) 0% 0% 0.50%
Packet loss (server→ client) 0% 0% 0%
MOS Score 4.3 4.1 4
Table III: VOIP Performance Comparison
to get a security policy for this connection request. This
procedure will introduce a marginal increase in page load
time of Youtube from 3.53 seconds to 3.81 seconds for the
first time. Any subsequent requests will be addressed by
matching policies in the in-memory Pol-DB and user will
experience (almost) no latency.
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Figure 6: IPerf bandwidth testing
Figure 5a shows the CDF graph for page load times for
Alexa Top 1000 websites (as of 23rd October 2015). It shows
that Securebox does not introduce significant latency com-
pared to the latency experienced with traditional networks.
Figure 5a also shows that Raspberry Pi version introduces
almost similar latency compared to the Fit-PC3, with much
powerful hardware. The similarity in the performance is
achieved by system design which requires Securebox to act
as a policy enforcer and does not put any computational
burden. It enables us to implement Securebox on a low-
powered devices running decent hardware, save costs and
improve portability without sacrificing the performance.
Figure 5b shows the results for file transfer over HTTP
and FTP from public internet servers. The results show that
proposed solution only increase download times by negligi-
ble percentage. Similar performance is achieved for Bittor-
rent traffic as shown in Fig. 5c. Bittorrent is an interesting
use case because the connected peers are constantly being
updated, new connections are made and old connections are
dropped. Therefore, there are many traffic analysis requests
being sent to CSS. However, the latency experienced by
Securebox is almost similar to that of traditional network.
Table III shows the performance achieved for Voice-over-
IP (VoIP) traffic. The jitter and consistency achieved by
Securebox for both uplink/ downlink traffic is similar to
that of a traditional network. Raspberry Pi version performs
equally good as Fit-PC3 based version, achieving similar
mean opinion score (MOS) score of 4, which shows that
proposed system can deliver good quality unjittered VOIP
traffic.
Pol-DB updates described in section III-C3 also contribute
in minimizing the latency. They provide aggregated policy
updates to the connected Secureboxes. It will increase the
chances of finding a matching policy in the local Pol-DB of
Securebox and reduces the number of requests made to CSS
for decisions on new connection requests, hence minimizing
the latency.
Figure 6 show the results obtained for bandwidth testing
using iperf servers in the Internet. Results shows that Secure-
box (both fitPC and R-Pi version) achieve similar bandwidth
as achieved in traditional networks.
B. Collaborative Threat Detection/Mitigation
Collaborative effort for detection of attacks and threats
in the network is another key contribution of the proposed
system.Section III-E explains how the Secureboxes installed
in different network segments can act as network sensors
which collect and send information to the CSS. The security
service analyzes the information to detect attacks going on
in disjoint networks. This broader view enables the Security
Service to detect threats in various networks before they can
substantially affect user in the network. Section III-C3 shows
that when a new attack is detected in any network segment,
Security Service dispatches Pol-DB updates to provide other
networks with security policies to mitigate similar attacks.
Traditionally, attacks on different networks are detected
long after they have infected the network. Once the attacks
are detected, there is no mechanism for sharing this infor-
mation with other entities because of legal and business
reasons. Attackers exploit this lack of information sharing
among network security teams and launch successful attacks
on different organizations using similar techniques. Security
professionals in each of these organizations face difficulties
in detecting them and organizations have already suffered
damage by the time these attacks are blocked.
Security community has long acknowledged the need for
a mechanism for sharing network attack related information
and there exists an IETF working group developing protocols
for sharing information about network attacks [51].
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Figure 7: Attacker controlled nodes launching attack upon
disjoint network segments
Figure 7 shows three disjoint network segments, each
connected through a Securebox to CSS and the Internet. The
attacker launches a port scanning attack on the hosts in these
network segments [39]. Figure 8 shows the traffic analysis
trends and the performance gain by using collaborative
threat detection approach. A total of 20 nodes were used
for generating traffic and a swarm of 15 zombie (attacker
controlled) nodes each scanning 1000 random ports were
used to attack three network segments each with three
connected hosts
Figure 8a – 8d show the extracts from the attack traffic.
These figures show the total attack traffic received, analyzed
and dropped during the attack and compares the performance
gain using collaborative approach.
Figure 8a shows that when the attacker initially launches
an attack on network 1. Securebox 1 initially sends all the
traffic to CSS for analysis. When CSS identifies the attacking
nodes, it directs Securebox 1 to drop any more traffic coming
from attacking nodes. Figure 8a shows that no traffic is
dropped in the beginning. But, the volume of traffic dropped
gradually increases as the CSS identifies more attacking
nodes. The amount of traffic analyzed also decreases because
Securebox 1 directly drops the traffic without sending it to
CSS.
Following collaborative approach, CSS generates a Pol-
DB to inform other network segments about the attacker
nodes detected from network 1 activity. Figure 8b shows
that Securebox 2 uses this information and drops all the
traffic from suspicious nodes. It prevents any traffic from
already detected attacker nodes to reach hosts inside the
network, therefore minimizing the malicious traffic entering
the network. Meanwhile, this approach also reduces the
volume of traffic anlayzed by CSS.
CSS generates another Pol-DB update containing the
list of attacker nodes detected by analyzing traffic from
network 2 activity. Using this information, Securebox 3 is
able to identify and drop ¿90% of the attack traffic without
analyzing it. Figure 8c shows that volume of traffic analyzed
is dropped to ¡10% of the total traffic received and all traffic
from attack nodes is immediately dropped at network entry
point.
With no collaboration in place, network 1, 2 and 3 will
need to process all the traffic initially and traffic is dropped
when CSS detects attacking nodes, as shown in Fig. 8d. No
attack information is shared between the networks so every
network needs to (re)detect the attacking nodes individually
which allows some of the malicious traffic to penetrate the
network before its detected.
C. Privacy
When network level statistics are shared with a third
party service and user traffic is anlayzed in the cloud
environment, privacy becomes an important concern. We
recently conducted a detailed user study asking our re-
spondents ”How comfortable would you be in sharing your
network traffic statistics to get better network security and
management”. Majority (¿ 60%) of the participants were
comfortable with sharing their data with third party pro-
viding network management and security services. Recent
research has explained that it is difficult to provide complete
accountability while offering complete anonymity to the
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Figure 8: Performance gain in attack detection using collaborative approach compared to traditional approaches
users [17]. Therefore, our proposed system only uses bare
minimum information from user to find a suitable trade-off
between user privacy and usable security.
When CSS is deployed by ISP, see section III-E, the
privacy does not become an issue because ISP already
performs a number of analysis on user traffic (to provide
better QoS). In-house deployment of CSS alleviates all
privacy concerns since it gives complete control over the
infrastructure, data sharing and analysis. It can perform
custom traffic analysis and manage Secureboxes deployed
in the network with personalized security and management
policies.
When CSS is deployed by a third party, different sub-
scription models, see section III-D, allow user to decide
what kind of services do they need for network management
and how much data they want to share. Both, user and the
service provider agree to the terms, which explicitly dictates
how user data will be stored, analyzed and shared by the
service provider. Users can opt-out to share their network
traffic data being analyzed, by paying a subscription fee for
the services and leased resources (i.e. middleboxes, traffic
analysis). CSS provider can offer free management services
or premium services to the users who agree to share their
network traffic data for analysis purposes.
D. Cost Efficiency
The cost of middleboxes range from hundreds to thou-
sands of dollars a piece. Hiring network security profes-
sional’s services for managing and updating these middle-
boxes can cost hundreds of dollars per hour. The update
cycle of these middleboxes is a couple of years after which
they need to be replaced by brand new equipment supporting
more functionalities and higher bandwidth. A new set of
equipment comes with deployment costs of their own. The
high cost of deploying and maintaining network security is
one of the reason why security is often neglected. Large
enterprises can dedicate resources to manage these high costs
but the problem is direr in the small enterprise and home
networks.
In typical enterprise environment, middlebox deployment
is underutilized most of the times and becomes a bottleneck
during peak access periods. The proposed solution provides
a cost efficient solution following pay as you use model.
The proposed model deploys bare minimum number of
middleboxes at all times, thus managing the resources more
efficiently. During peak access periods, the deployment au-
tomatically scales to prevent middlexboxes from becoming
the bottleneck for network traffic and reduce customer churn.
SDN allows us to efficiently distribute traffic load among the
middleboxes deployed in the cloud. In the proposed model,
the cost of replacing a non-functional middlebox is much
low compared to the cost of replacing a physical middlebox.
Table II shows the Securebox deployment using Raspberry
PI like device costs ¡ USD 50 and provide almost similar
performance as achieved by traditional networks, see section
V. [24] also gives a detailed discussion on the how much cost
is saved by deploying middleboxes in the cloud environment
instead of deploying them physically at network vantage
points.
E. Scalability
Securebox design supports scalability due to its small
size and minimal management overhead. User only needs
to deploy the Secureboxes at network vantage points and
connect them to CSS, which will ensure that all Secureboxes
operate with consistent network policies. This model is also
useful in enterprise environments where networking team
only deploys Secureboxes at new establishments and offices
and connects them to the CSS which installs initial set of
policies and later makes sure that every Securebox has a
coherent set of policies for operation. Network managers no
longer need to individually configure middleboxes, switches
or routers, saving resources and time. This exercise also min-
imizes any chances of inconsistent policies across network
devices (which are very difficult to detect in the operational
environment).
Section V-D explains the problems with traditional mid-
dleboxes e.g. underutilization, lack of scalability, update
cycle and high costs etc. These problems incur high costs
on already expensive network security infrastructure for an
enterprise. Any network outages or bottlenecks can cause
significant business losses. Therefore, the proposed system
uses cloud resources to deploy traffic analysis services which
can scale in real time while maintaining lower costs. Sherry
et al. also supports our claim that using cloud resources to
deploy middleboxes can reduces costs for enterprise security
infrastructure [24].
F. Attacks against system
The proposed system is susceptible to attacks by rogue Se-
cureboxes and compromised CSS. Individual or set of rogue
Secureboxes (working in collusion) can repeatedly generate
malformed requests to CSS, compelling CSS to generate
policies which mark suspicious/ insecure connections as
safe. Rogue Secureboxes can also launch a DoS attack on
the security service. On the other hand, a compromised
security service can generate security services which force
all Secureboxes to connect all traffic to any destinations.
Any rogue node in the network can also claim to be a
security service and start generating security updates to the
Secureboxes in the network.
Figure 3 highlights the Certification Authority, which is
responsible of managing and issuing certificates to connected
Secureboxes. When a Securebox is registered, a certificate is
generated for it to communicate with CSS. All updates from
CSS are encrypted and signed. Securebox will reject any
updates coming from sources other than the registered CSS
and report those sources back to the CSS. Similarly, CSS
logs the traffic analysis request and any Securebox show-
ing suspicious behaviour i.e. generating fake or repeated
requests, is blacklisted. The proposed system design does not
allow Secureboxes to communicate with each other, which
prevents any chances of Securebox generating false Pol-DB
updates to each other.
G. Uplink bandwidth saving
User bandwidth is a precious resources and the proposed
system ensures that security service has minimal impact
on the user bandwidth. Every traffic analysis request for
a new connection contains ¡40 bytes of information. The
Pol-DB updates also help in minimizing the number of
traffic analysis request generated by the user. Section III-C3
explains that scheme followed by Pol-DB updates which
uses periods of less traffic activity for generating updates.
VI. RELATED WORK
Following the initial proposal of ETHANE to manage
control plane in runtime, researchers showed the possibilities
of how this technology could revolutionize the traditional
networking [38]. SDN has been a hot topic in academic
research community since 2010. Google’s announcement
for using SDN to control its inter-datacenter traffic routing
further increased the popularity of SDN with increased
deployments in real-time traffic [56]. Both the academic and
industrial community proposed a number of techniques for
improving SDN performance, fault tolerance. However, SDN
has been mainly deployed in large enterprise to manage
WAN and data center traffic [37]. This paper is the first
attempt to exploit the potential of SDN for managing SOHO
and SME networks including IoT and BYOD environments.
A. Academic Research
SDN research has mainly focused on improving perfor-
mance and fault tolerance of SDN controllers and better
communication with OVS hardware. Different SDN con-
trollers have been proposed by researchers offering better
security, resilience to attacks. Elasticon is proposed in [36],
which is a distributed SDN controller to minimize impacts of
DDoS attacks against the SDN controller. Besides improving
the security for SDN, researchers have also been investigat-
ing how to apply SDN to enhance security for mobile and
wireless networks [28], [29].
SDN and network function virtualization (NFV) has
opened new possibilities to improve network management.
Researchers have also explored the possibility of virtualizing
the middleboxes to achieve reduced costs and increased
scalability. Sherry et al. have proposed to deploy virtual
middleboxes in the cloud environment and showed that there
is no significant performance degradation [24]. A model
offering DPI as a service has been proposed in [11]. Their
work complements our proposed system for setting up the
virtual middleboxes in the CSS. Deidtect proposes the use
of SDN to dynamically re-route network traffic through a
centralized middlebox deployment (possibly in the cloud en-
vironment) [27]. Their solution only explores SDN support
for dynamic re-routing of traffic in enterprise environment
but does not provide significant evaluation of its perfor-
mance. Our work exploits SDN’s potential for managing
network policies, monitoring per device communications,
interactions and dynamic re-routing of traffic through CSS.
The proposed CSS offers many more features compared to
a standard middlebox deployment.
SENSS proposes an interface design for ISPs which can
provide user’s traffic statistics on demand [26]. Users can
then make an analysis if they are under an attack and request
ISP to take user-directed actions to secure their networks.
This proposal requires significant user interaction to analyze
traffic traces and make decision about what should be done
to secure the network. ISPs might not be comfortable to
provide an interface to users for accessing traffic statistics
and manipulating traffic propagation. Alwabel et al. proposes
a model where users can classify their traffic from the ISP
and decide what path should it follow to their network e.g.
users would want class A traffic to be redirected through
middleboxes, whereas class B traffic coming directly to their
network [22]. Once again, ISP may not allow the users to
control the routing of their traffic.
Researchers have proposed a system to control the wire-
less AP using SDN [35] but their work is focused on AP
management and does not focus on the security aspect. This
work can be used by Securebox deployments in wireless
environments. Resonance has been proposed for securing
enterprise environments by providing dynamic access con-
trol on flow level information [13].
Recent set of events have greatly increased public aware-
ness of privacy of their data and people are concerned for
the privacy of their data and devices more than ever before.
Hacking, online scams, digital extortion and state sponsored
cyber espionage activities has become an increasing concern
for the users. Many contemporary devices contain sensors
collecting information about the environment and the users
[43]. New generation of smartphones contains tens of these
sensors and there have been plenty of cases where smart-
phone and mobile devices have been used to spy on the user
[62].
Researchers have been working on the idea of how to
make smartphones more secure so that they do not leak
sensitive information about the user to unwanted entities.
Databox has been proposed in [30], which collects all
the information about the user and shares it only with
authenticated third parties. OpenPDS based service provides
”safe answers” to the third parties asking for data collected
from the users [8]. These ”safe answers” are designed not
to leak any related information about the users.
Securebox can offer similar functionalities for IoT and
mobile devices. An IoT hub module in the Securebox can
collect data from the IoT devices connected to the network
and provide an interface for third party applications to access
this data. Securebox will provide authenticated and validated
access to the collected information from user specified
applications. Securebox will thoroughly audit each incoming
data request and only respond to queries coming from trusted
sources. However, this functionality will require support
from industrial manufacturers and third party services to
work with this architecture.
B. Industrial Research
Many industrial actors have been trying to improve gate-
ways to make them smarter and automatically manageable.
Recently, Google announced OnHub solution for home
environments [57]. OnHub currently manages home wireless
network environment and provides automatic management
services via Google-On application but Google OnHub
comes at a heavy price tag of USD 219. Qualcomm R©
has presented a secure home gateway and IoT hub by
combining Gigabit Wi-Fi support of Qualcomm R© VIVE
802.11 and Qualcomm R© StreamBoost technology [58]. It
provides security features like parental control and automatic
virus detection features. Qualcomm has included a high
performance processor so that the device can learn user
actions and mimic them later.
Home gateway initiative (HGI) is an alliance of leading
home gateway manufacturers working together to improve
the home gateway experience [59]. HGI’s role is to specify
requirements and plans for home gateways that support QoS
and roll-out of triple play and broadband services. HGI
work on enabling services to include delivery framework
for smarthome services. ProSyst series of products launched
by Bosch Group provide multi service platform for smart
homes. They provide a framework for developing smart
home applications and creates a market place for it to benefit
third party developers and open source standard platform
[60].
Currently available IoT hubs do not offer many features
and are difficult to operate but a number of manufacturers
have been developing new technologies for smarter home
gateways and IoT hubs by including features like automated
management. Most of this work has been targeted to get bet-
ter wireless coverage, easier device communication, higher
bandwidth available for the connected devices. However,
security aspect is not considered in most of the cases. Our
proposed system bundles the management features and ac-
cess point control along with better security functionalities.
It also provides features like parental control, restricted
D2D communication, better traffic analysis and middlebox
functionalities etc.
VII. CONCLUSION
Our proposed system is the first realization of the idea
to bring remote management, enterprise grade security and
benefits of SDN to SOHO and small enterprise networks.
Securebox is an easy to deploy, highly portable solution
with much lower cost. System evaluation has shown that
it can be deployed on Raspberry Pi sized devices which
increase portability and reduce costs. CSS offers subscribers
a facility to analyze their traffic through middleboxes in
cloud environment. It also enables remote management of
Secureboxes that are installed at network edge, to take the
burden of network management away from users. Offloading
the traffic analysis and network management operations to
CSS increases the system scalability for home and enterprise
networks. Secureboxes installed in different networks act as
a sensor for CSS and collect network level statistics from
these networks. CSS can use this data to perform analysis
to detect botnets, malwares and other insights about the
network. The result of their analysis can be used to detect,
threats to network security, improve QoS and management
for subscriber’s networks. Our proposed system introduces
a collaborative scheme which allows networks to share
attack related information which helps in rapid detection and
mitigation of attacks on disjoint network segments.
Our work shows that using SDN in SOHO and small
enterprise environments does not degrade user experience.
The system is designed to minimize impacts on network
latency and user privacy. Our experiment results show that
Securebox introduces only a marginal (almost negligible)
increase in latency experienced by the user. We also intro-
duce a number of subscription models for CSS to ensure
user privacy. CSS analyzes the data collected from connected
networks to detect various abnormal behaviors and threats
occurring in those networks. The collaborative scheme in-
troduced in this paper allows CSS to rapidly share this
information with all Secureboxes so that they can promptly
block any attempts to attack the network.
Our prototype system has shown that the proposed model
for securing home and enterprise environments is functional
and effective. It can be deployed incrementally with current
infrastructure and can resolve many security and network
management problems in traditional networks. It can ease
the tasks of enterprise network management teams. The pro-
posed model also resolves many security issues encountered
in IoT and BYOD environments.
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